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Eminent Domain-Time as of Which
Damages Are Assessed
The federal constitutional requirement that the owner of prop-
erty taken in condemnation proceedings shall receive just com-
pensation" has been interpreted to mean that it rests neither with
the legislative branch of the government2 nor the executive branch'
to say what compensation shall be paid or even what shall be the
rule of compensation; that the ascertainment of just compensation
is a judicial inquiry.4 On the other hand, it is a matter of legislative
discretion as to which tribunal shall be eligible to determine
the valuation.
Where the property being condemned is fluctuating in value,
the selection of the date for valuation may be important. Con-
stitutional provisions for just compensation consistently have been
held to require that the property taken be valued as of the time
of taking.'; The great weight of authority excludes from the value
at that time any increment due to the proposed improvement.7
The time of taking rule is flexible in that the whole course of the
condemnation proceeding is considered a taking in a general sense,
which makes it necessary to fix the time more specifically. The
broad rule is somewhat focalized by the concept that the taking
occurs at the time of the termination of the dominion of the owner
and segregation of the property for public use.8 This test is also
difficult of application in the light of the concept of ownership as
an aggregate of rights, privileges, powers and immunities," as
these may not all be taken from the owner at one time. For
example, the taking may be said to begin at the time it becomes
known that the property is to be condemned because the owner
can no longer with reasonable certainty assure prospective buyers
that he can convey effectively the future use in perpetuity. The
process of taking may then continue through the loss of other
'U. S. CONST. AMEND. V; AMEND. XIV, § 1.
2 Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
United States v. New River Collieries, 262 U.S. 341 (1923).
'See notes 2 and 3 supra.
'United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513 (1883); Kohl v. United States, 91
U.S. 367 (1875).
MCCORMICK, DAMAGES 555 (1935).
'See Note, 147 A.L.R. 66 (1943).
Benedict v. Cit, of New York, 98 Fed. 789 (C.C.A. 2d 1899), cert. denied,
179 U.S. 685 (1900)
Cook, Hohfeld's Co-ntributios to the Sczelece of Law, 28 YALE L. J. 721,
731 (1919).
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components of ownership until the proceedings can no longer be
abandoned by the condemnor, at which time it is complete.
Illustrative of the variation in the steps Which have been held
to constitute the taking for purposes of determining the time for
ascertainment of value are the following: time of entry; 1O time
property was converted;"' time land appropriated ;12 time of filing
petition ;13 time of trial ;14 instant the property was taken or dam-
aged; 1" date of impaneling jury;- date condemnor filed bond and
made deposit ;17 time of making award;i" time of payment of award."'
The federal constitution does not require payment before taking,
although this is required by a number of state constitutions.20
Where the taking for a public improvement is wrongful because of
the failure of the condemnor to utilize proper proceedings, the
owner may be allowed to recover the value of the property at the
time of trial together with the loss of its use to the time of trial.2'
Although definition of just compensation is a judicial function,
the legislature may in effect determine the specific time as of which
valuation shall be made by statutory designation of the time of
termination of the dominion of the owner and segregation of the
property for the public use.22 A minority of the American juris-
dictions specify in general condemnation procedure statutes a
particular step within the procedure as the time for ascertainment
of compensation. These include: date of filing petition and order
thereon ;23 date of summons or notice, with no compensation for
improvements subsequent to date of service ;24 date of serivce of
" Yara Engineering Corp. v. City of Newark, 136 N.J. Eq. 453, 42A 2d 632
(Ch. 1945).
" In re Board of Water Supply of City of New York, 277 N.Y. 452, 14 N.E.
2d 789 (1938).
' State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Blobeck Inv. Co., 233 Mo. App.
858, 110 S.W 2d 860 (1937).
' Hocking Valley Ry. Co. v. Ornstein, 18 Ohio L. Abs. 424 (P. Ct. 1935).
14 Muskingum Watershed Conservancy District v. Kaufman, 36 Ohio L. Abs.
480, 44 N.E. 2d 723 (App. 1940)
' Donaldson v. City of Bismarck, 71 N.D. 592, 3 N.W. 2d 808 (1942).
" Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Ornstein, 11 Ohio Op. 129 (App. 1947),
appeal dismissed, 133 Ohio St. 385, 13 N.E. 2d 909 (1938)
' 
7 Aycock v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 175 S.W. 2d 710 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1943).
Pardeeville Elec. Lt. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 238 Wis. 97, 297 N.W. 394
(1941).
" Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271 (1939).
ROTTSCHAEFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 722, 723 (1939)
'Morn v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., 30 Minn. 100, 14 N.W 460 (1882);
Texas Western Ry. Co. v. Cave, 80 Tex. 137, 15 S.W. 786 (1891).
' Benedict v. City of New York, 98 Fed. 789 (C.C.A. 2d 1899), cert. denied,
179 U.S. 685 (1900).
2N. J. STAT. ANN. § 20:1-9 (1937).
2ALASKA COMP. LAws § 1574 (1933); ARiz. CODE ANN. § 27-916 (1939);
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summons or notice to appear ;2, date of trial but no compensation
for improvements subsequent to date of service of summons ;26 date
of hearing ;27 date of adoption of the order establishing right of
petitioner to take.21 It has been ruled that statutes designating a
time of valuation which is determined to be either prior to or sub-
sequent to the time of taking are unconstitutional. In the case of
Opelousas G. & N E. Ry. Co. v. St. Landry Cotton Oil Co.,29 inter-
preting the Louisiana condemnation statute0 which reads ". . . the
basis of assessment shall be the true value which the land possessed
before the contemplated improvement was proposed . . ." the court
held that the legislature must have meant as of the time of taking
and not as of the time before the public improvement was proposed,
on the ground that the latter would be unconstitutional as a taking
without just compensation. In Forster v Scott"l the court held
unconstitutional, as denying just compensation, a statute which
provided that if condemnation proceedings followed the filing of
maps of proposed routes of streets, the value of such land as might
be taken should exclude the value of improvements made by the
owner prior to the condemnation proceedings and subsequent to
the filing of the map. In Kittinger v. Rossmn an 2 a statute declaring
that one thereafter building on land within the future lines of a
street if extended shall not be entitled to damages for the improve-
ment was held invalid as depriving the owner of use without
compensation.
There are a number of factors which tend to prevent the de-
velopment of a universal rule. In many instances the exact time
chosen is of no practical importance and a series of such cases may
build up a pattern of stare decisis.3 The doctrine that a term of
court is regarded in law as but a single day 34 may furnish a partial
rationalization of the courts' attitude, in sum, that any date within
the litigation is constitutionally unobjectionable. The process of
CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. ANN., pt. 3, tit. 7, § 1249 (1941), HAWAII REv. LAWS §
315 (1945); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 13-712 (1932); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 9945
(1935); N. M. STAT. ANN. § 25-909 (1941)
' NEV. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 9164 (1929), IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1706 (Burns
1933), UTAH CODE ANN. § 104-61-12 (1943).
' N. D. REv. CODE § 32-1523 (1943).
STEx. Civ. STAT., art. 3265 (1925).
MASS. ANN. LAws, c. 80A, § 12 (1933).
118 La. 290, 42 So. 940 (1907).
'LA. Civ. CODE ANN., art. 2633 (1945).
136 N.Y. 577, 32 N.E. 976 (1893)
12 Del. Ch. 276, 112 Atl. 388 (Ch. 1921)
For an owner's constitutional rights to be infringed the rules applied in
deternming just compensation must have disregarded the owner's rights so
greatly as to produce a clearly arbitrary result. Roberts v. City of New York,
295 U.S. 264 (1935).
People ex rel. Waber v. Wells, 255 Ill. 450, 99 N.E. 606 (1912).
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taking may spread over a period of time.3 5 The court may set aside
its usual rule to avoid an unusual hardship 6 Aside from the diffi-
culties of selecting the exact time to use, its importance in deter-
mination of the final result may be diminished by the uncertainty
attending other steps of the process of evaluation. The exclusion
of certain elements actually present and increasing value37 and the
exclusion of other elements actually present and decreasing value 3
may result in evaluating a group of rights that do not constitute
an existing property. When the condemnation involves a unique
property such as real estate there is no universal formula for
determining "true market value." Thus it would appear that the
problem of assessing value in condemnation proceedings may in-
volve the assignment of an arbitrary amount for an imaginary
property as of a fictitious date.
It is suggested that where the time of divestiture cannot be
precisely determined, the better rule would embrace the following:
1. Value as of the date of filing petition. An earlier date
would permit the condemnor to take advantage of the
owner by avoiding compensation for increase of value
during the interval, while a later date would put a greater
problem of speculation on the condemnor and would give
the owner opportunity to enhance the damages.
2. Exclude any increment or decrement due to the proposed
improvement. Neither the public nor the owner should
profit at the expense of the other.
3. Add actual damages for interference with possession
prior to filing petition. There would be a tendency to
avoid such injuries where the advantages to the con-
demnor are not at least equal to the injury suffered by
the owner.
4. Add actual damages for improvements made by the owner
in good faith between the date of the petition and service
of summons. Unnecessary losses resulting from delay in
notice to the owner would be minimized if the condemnor
had a financial incentive to avoid them.
5. Award actual damages in the event of abandonment of
proceedings subsequent to date of filing petition. In
changing plans the condemnor would tend to weigh the
advantages to the public against the injury to the owner,
and losses which society would otherwise suffer from
inadeqate planning by the condemnor would be minimized.
Howard Crown
See text, page 80.
In a jurisdiction where the usual rule was date of impaneling jury, when
the economic depression intervened between the date of filing petition and the
time of impaneling jury, it was held that to avoid hardship the date of filing
petition would be used as the date for determination of value. Hocking Valley
Ry. Co. v. Ornstein, note 13 supra.
See Note, 147 A.L.R. 66 (1943)
'Graham v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Ry Co., 145 Pa. 504, 23 Atl. 239
(1891).
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